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Abstract: This note explores the consequences of nonlinear price impact
functions on price dynamics within the chartist-fundamentalist framework. Price
impact functions may be nonlinear with respect to trading volume. As indicated
by recent empirical studies, a given transaction may cause a large (small) price
change if market depth is low (high). Simulations reveal that such a relationship
may create endogenous complex price fluctuations even if the trading behavior
of chartists and fundamentalists is linear.
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1 Introduction
Interactions between heterogeneous agents, so-called chartists and fundamen-
talists, may generate endogenous price dynamics either due to nonlinear trad-
ing rules or due to a switching between simple linear trading rules.1,2 Overall,
multi-agent models appear to be quite successful in replicating financial mar-
ket dynamics.3,4 In addition, this research direction has important applications.
On the one hand, understanding the working of financial markets may help
to design better investment strategies.5 On the other hand, it may facilitate
the regulation of disorderly markets. For instance, Ehrenstein shows that the
imposition of a low transaction tax may stabilize asset price fluctuations.6
Within these models, the orders of the traders typically drive the price via
a log linear price impact function: Buying orders shift the price proportion-
ally up and selling orders shift the price proportionally down. Recent empirical
evidence suggests, however, that the relationship between orders and price ad-
justment may be nonlinear. Moreover, as reported by Farmer et al., large price
fluctuations occur when market depth is low.3,7 Following this observation, our
goal is to illustrate a novel mechanism for endogenous price dynamics.
We investigate – within an otherwise linear chartist-fundamentalist setup
– a price impact function which depends nonlinearly on market depth. To be
precise, a given transaction yields a larger price change when market depth is
low than when it is high. Simulations indicate that such a relationship may lead
to complex price movements. The dynamics may be sketched as follows. The
market switches back and forth between two regimes. When liquidity is high,
the market is relatively stable. But low price fluctuations indicate only weak
trading signals and thus the transactions of speculators decline. As liquidity
decreases, the price responsiveness of a trade increases. The market becomes
unstable and price fluctuations increase again.
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The remainder of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the
empirical evidence on price impact functions. In section 3, we present our model,
and in section 4, we discuss the main results. The final section concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
Financial prices are obviously driven by the orders of heterogeneous agents.
However, it is not clear what the true functional form of price impact is. For
instance, Farmer proposes a log linear price impact function for theoretical anal-
ysis while Zhang develops a model with nonlinear price impact.8,9 His approach
is backed up by empirical research that documents a concave price impact func-
tion. According to Hasbrouck, the larger is the order size, the smaller is the
price impact per trade unit.10 Also Kempf and Korn, using data on DAX fu-
tures, and Plerou et al., using data on the 116 most frequently traded US stocks,
find that the price impact function displays a concave curvature with increasing
order size, and flattening out at larger values.11,12 Weber and Rosenow fitted a
concave function in the form of a power law and obtained an impressive corre-
lation coefficient of 0.977.13 For a further theoretical and empirical debate on
the possible shape of the price impact function with respect to the order size
see Gabaix et al., Farmer and Lillo and Plerou et al.14−16
But these results are currently challenged by an empirical study which is
crucial for this note. Farmer et al. present evidence that price fluctuations
caused by individual market orders are essentially independent of the volume
of the orders.7 Instead, large price fluctuations are driven by fluctuations in
liquidity, i.e. variations in the market’s ability to absorb new orders. The
reason is that even for the most liquid stocks there can be substantial gaps in
the order book. When such a gap exists next to the best price – due to low
liquidity – even a small new order can remove the best quote and trigger a large
price change. These results are supported by Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam
who also document that there is considerable time variation in market wide
liquidity and Lillo, Farmer and Mantenga who detect that higher capitalization
stocks tend to have smaller price responses for the same normalized transaction
size.17,18
Note that the relation between liquidity and price impact is of direct impor-
tance to investors developing trading strategies and to regulators attempting to
stabilize financial markets. Farmer et al. argue, for instance, that agents who
are trying to transact large amounts should split their orders and execute them
a little at a time, watching the order book, and taking whatever liquidity is
available as it enters.7 Hence, when there is a lot of volume in the market, they
should submit large orders. Assuming a concave price impact function would
obviously lead to quite different investment decisions. Ehrenstein, Westerhoff
and Stauffer demonstrate, for instance, that the success of a Tobin tax depends
on its impact on market depth.19 Depending on the degree of the nonlinearity
of the price impact function, a transaction tax may stabilize or destabilize the
markets.
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3 The Model
Following Simon, agents are boundedly rational and display a rule-governed
behavior.20 Moreover, survey studies reveal that financial market participants
rely strongly on technical and fundamental analysis to predict prices.21,22 Char-
tists typically extrapolate past price movements into the future. Let P be the
log of the price. Then, their orders may be expressed as
DCt = a(Pt − Pt−1), (1)
where a is a positive reaction coefficient denoting the strength of the trading.
Accordingly, technical traders submit buying orders if prices go up and vice
versa. In contrast, fundamentalists expect the price to track its fundamental
value. Orders from this type of agent may be written as
DFt = b(F − Pt). (2)
Again, b is a positive reaction coefficient, and F stands for the log of the fun-
damental value. For instance, if the asset is overvalued, fundamentalists submit
selling orders.
As usual, excess buying drives the price up and excess selling drives it down
so that the price adjustment process may be formalized as
Pt+1 = Pt +At(wD
C
t + (1− w)D
F
t ), (3)
where w indicates the fraction of chartists and (1 − w) the fraction of funda-
mentalists. The novel idea is to base the degree of price adjustmen A on a
nonlinear function of the market depth.23 Exploiting that given excess demand
has a larger (smaller) impact on the price if the trading volume is low (high),
one may write
At =
c
(|wDCt |+ |(1− w)D
F
t |)
d
. (4)
The curvature of A is captured by d ≥ 0, while c > 0 is a shift parameter.
For d = 0, the price adjustment function is log-linear.1,3 In that case, the
law of motion of the price, derived from combining (1) to (4), is a second-order
linear difference equation which has a unique steady state at
Pt+1 = Pt = Pt−1 = F. (5)
Rewriting Schur’s stability conditions, the fixed point is stable for
0 < c <


1
aw
for w >
b
4a+ b
2
b(1− w) − 2aw
else
. (6)
However, we are interested in the case where d > 0. Combining (1)-(4) and
solving for P yields
Pt+1 = Pt + c
wa(Pt − Pt−1) + (1− w)b(F − Pt)
(|wa(Pt − Pt−1)|+ |(1− w)b(F − Pt)|)d
, (7)
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which is a two-dimensional nonlinear difference equation. Since (7) precludes
closed analysis, we simulate the dynamics to demostrate that the underlying
structure gives rise to endogenous deterministic motion.
4 Some Results
Figure 1 contains three bifurcation diagrams for 0 < d < 1 and w = 0.7 (top),
w = 0.5 (central) and w = 0.3 (bottom). The other parameters are fixed at
a = b = c = 1 and the log of the fundamental value is F = 0. We increase d in
500 steps. In each step, P is plotted from t =1001-1100. Note that bifurcation
diagrams are frequently used to illustrate the dynamic properties of nonlinear
systems.
Figure 1 suggests that if d is small, there may exist a stable equilibrium. For
instance, for w = 0.5, prices converge towards the fundamental value as long as
d is smaller than around 0.1. If d is increased further, the fixed point becomes
unstable. In addition, the range in which the fluctuations take place increases
too. Note also that many different types of bifurcation occur. Our model gen-
erates the full range of possible dynamic outcomes: fixed points, limit cycles,
quasi periodic motion and chaotic fluctuations. For some parameter combina-
tions coexisting attractors emerge. Comparing the three panels indicates that
the higher the fraction of chartists, the less stable the market seems to be.
To check the robustness of endogenous motion, figure 2 presents bifurcation
diagrams for 0 < a < 2 (top), 0 < b < 2 (central) and 0 < c < 2 (bottom),
with the remaining parameters fixed at a = b = c = 1 and d = w = 0.5. Again,
complicated movements arise. While chartism seems to destabilize the market,
fundamentalism is apparently stabilizing. Naturally, a higher price adjustment
destabilizes the market as well. Overall, many parameter combinations exist
which trigger complicated motion.1
Let us finally explore what drives the dynamics. Figure 3 shows the dynam-
ics in the time domain for a = 0.85, b = c = 1, and d = w = 0.5. The first,
second and third panel present the log of the price P , the price adjustment A
and the trading volume V for 150 observations, respectively. Visual inspection
reveals that the price circles around its fundamental value without any tendency
to converge. Nonlinear price adjustment may thus be an endogenous engine for
volatility and trading volume. Note that when trading volume drops the price
adjustment increases and price movements are amplified. However, the dynam-
ics does not explode since a higher trading volume leads again to a decrease in
the price adjustment.
Finally, figure 4 displays the price (top panel) and the trading volume (bot-
tom panel) for 5000 observations (a = 0.25, b = 1, c = 50, d = 2 and w = 0.5).
As can be seen, the dynamics may become quite complex. Remember that trad-
ing volume increases with increasing price changes (orders of chartists) and/or
increasing deviations from fundamentals (orders of fundametalists). In a styl-
ized way, the dynamics may thus be sketched as follows: Suppose that trading
volume is relatively low. Since the price adjustment A is strong, the system
1To observe permanent fluctuations only small variations in A are needed. Suppose that
A takes two values centered around the upper bound of the stability condition X, say X − Y
and X + Y , depending on whether trading volume is above or below a certain level Z. Such
a system obviously produces nonconvergent but also nonexplosive fluctuations for arbitrary
values of Y and Z.
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Figure 1: Bifurcation diagrams for 0 < d < 1 and w = 0.7 (top), w = 0.5
(central) and w = 0.3 (bottom). The other parameters are fixed at a = b = c =
1. The parameter d is increased in 500 steps. For each value of d, P is plotted
from t =1001-1100. The log of the fundamental value is F = 0.5
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Figure 2: Bifurcation diagrams for 0 < a < 2 (top), 0 < b < 2 (central) and
0 < c < 2 (bottom), with the remaining parameters fixed at a = b = c = 1
and d = w = 0.5. The bifurcation parameters are increased in 500 steps. For
each value, P is plotted from t =1001-1100. The log of the fundamental value
is F = 0.
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Figure 3: The dynamics in the time domain for a = 0.85, b = c = 1, and
d = w = 0.5. The first, second and third panel show the price P , the price
adjustment A and the trading volume V for 150 observations, respectively. The
log of the fundamental value is F = 0.
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is unstable. As the trading becomes increasingly hectic, prices start to diverge
from the fundamental value. At some point, however, the trading activity has
become so strong that, due to the reduction of the price adjustment A, the
system becomes stable. Afterwards, a period of convergence begins until the
system jumps back to the unstable regime. This process continually repeats
itself but in an intricate way.
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Figure 4: The dynamics in the time domain for a = 0.25, b = 1, c = 50, d = 2
and w = 0.5. The first (second) panel displays the price P (the trading volume
V ) for 5000 observations. The log of the fundamental value is F = 0.
5 Conclusions
When switching between simple linear trading rules and/or relying on nonlin-
ear strategies, interactions between heterogeneous agents may cause irregular
dynamics. This note shows that changes in market depth also stimulate price
changes. The reason is that if market liquidity goes down, a given order obtains
a larger price impact. For a broad range of parameter combinations, erratic
yet deterministic trajectories emerge since the system switches back and forth
between stable and unstable regimes.
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